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Does Europe have a “German Problem” 
Once Again?
 Since the beginning of Europe’s sovereign debt cri-
sis, Germany’s reluctance to shoulder the responsibility 
of rescuing the euro has drawn considerable criticism. 
Whatever we may think about the quality of Merkel’s 
leadership, her attitude is puzzling above all from a long-
term analytical perspective. Historically, the integration of 
Europe started in the 1950s when the founding fathers 
of Europe set out to address Europe’s “German prob-
lem”.  Shedding its hegemonic ambitions, the Federal 
Republic of Germany became for several decades an 
unconditional supporter of European integration.  Today, 
Germany’s place in Europe is once again in question. 
Chancellor Merkel’s hard-nosed defense of Germany’s 
national interests seems to indicate a post-reunification 
shift from the pro-integration “Bonn Republic” to a more 
self-centered and assertive “Berlin Republic”.  The ques-
tion is, therefore, whether Europe has a new German 
problem on its hands:  How far will Germany’s assertive-
ness go? And will it jeopardize the foundations of the 
European Union?
 The contributions to this EUSA Forum offer tenta-
tive answers to this question. Mark Blyth and Abraham 
Newman criticize Germany for trying to avoid blame 
for a crisis that it helped create by massively extending 
credit and selling exported goods to peripheral member 
states. As Blyth and Newman see it, German leaders 
should now stop pushing for fiscal austerity and should 
underwrite a European regime of “hegemonic stability”. 
Tobias Schulze-Cleven sees Chancellor Merkel’s hesi-
tant handling of the crisis as a sign of German fragility, 
rather than strength.  He highlights Germany’s “domestic 
institutional exhaustion” after many years of incurring 
the costs of reunification and economic adjustment.  For 
Mark Vail, Germany has effectively turned “parochial” 
and abandoned its postwar commitment to multilater-
alism. Vail sees this as a potentially durable change 
in Germany’s political identity.  For Brigitte Young, the 
main problem is Merkel’s and other German officials’ 
adherence to “ordoliberalism”. Germany’s quasi-official 
economic doctrine does not work well at all in times of 
crisis, but policymakers are still clinging to it.
 I hope these contributions will be useful for readers to 
think more deeply about a highly topical problem.  Since 
this also happens to be the first EUSA Forum that I am 
editing, I want to acknowledge the good work of Amie 
Kreppel, my predecessor as EUSA Review Editor. I will 
do my best to continue in the same spirit.
Nicolas Jabko, EUSA Review Editor
Thanks to Germany it’s 2008 all Over Again
Mark Blyth and Abraham Newman
 The greatest swindle of modern times is the massive 
‘bait and switch’ perpetrated on the publics of Europe 
by their governments on behalf of their banks. What we 
refer to today as the ‘European Sovereign Debt Crisis’ 
began largely as a private sector financial crisis when 
too big to fail banks got caught with too many worthless 
assets on their books in 2008. Politicians deftly, and all 
too quickly, turned this into a crisis of the public sector 
by profligate governments, ironically. While the story of 
fiscal irresponsibility has some plausibility in the Greek 
case, it simply isn’t true for much anyone else. In short, 
ballooning public debt is a consequence of the financial 
crisis, it is not a cause of it. It occurred when the debt 
of the private sector was transformed into public sector 
debt via bailouts, lost revenues, lower growth, and higher 
transfers.  Although a politics of blame and austerity 
may serve the short-term electoral interests of politi-
cians from European countries that currently enjoy low 
debt burdens, it will undermine their long-term growth 
prospects and fracture the European solidarity needed 
to restore economic stability to the continent. 
 It is important to get the causality right if you are go-
ing to apportion blame. Blame should be focused in large 
part on unanticipated consequences of the Eurozone 
system.  With the introduction of the Euro, credit rating 
agencies exported Germany’s stellar rating across the 
members.  Banks with excess capital in Germany and 
other core countries found new clients in the periphery 
with new access to credit, who then turned around and 
bought German goods.  A liquidity cycle was born in 
Europe that seemed to benefit everyone on the upside 
but then came crashing down when the financial crisis 
exposed the underlying economic fiction. The German 
government, however, has largely cast the blame on the 
individual states saddled with debt from the rupture of 
the Euro-liquidity boom, ignoring the larger systemic na-
ture of the crisis. The banks are back, raking in bonuses 
and using the taxpayers as insurance, while European 
citizens are squeezed to pay for the mess. 
 Rather than see this transfer as a structural inevita-
bility that Europe as a whole had to deal with, Germany 
painted the crisis as a struggle between the parsimoni-
ous North and the profligate South. The German answer 
to this misdiagnosed crisis, now universally applied, was 
austerity: voluntary internal deflation in the periphery to 
reduce wages and prices to levels commensurate with 
their external financial position. In other words, the Ger-
mans thought it was a good idea to run a gold standard 
in a multi-state democracy despite their own supposed 
deep historical memory of what happened the last time 
this was tried. 
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 The results were predictably disastrous for the pe-
riphery states. They have suffered year-on-year GDP 
declines, and as a result their debt to GDP ratios have 
increased, not decreased, despite the cuts. This makes 
their bondholders more nervous, and so to placate them 
they must make more cuts, which results in more debt, 
and occasionally a loan from the Germans (kicking the 
can down the road), but it’s really just debt on top of 
debt. This has been going on for a year and a half and 
it no longer stops at the periphery. 
 The initial cost of buying and holding Greek debt 
in order to stabilize the Eurozone was around 50 bil-
lion euros. Today, after several failed grand bargains, 
and the latest Merkel/Sarkozy press conference where 
once again nothing was actually done, if one tracks the 
contagion mechanism around the periphery and adds 
up the cost, it now ends up on the balance sheets of 
Italian and French banks at around 2 trillion euros. This 
is too big to bail. 
 The result is that the Eurozone today resembles a 
2008 vintage subprime Collateralized Debt Obligation 
(CDO). The periphery are the riskiest junior tranche, the 
Italians are, appropriately, the mezzanine tranche, with 
France and Germany as the senior tranche. And just 
like 2007-8, all you need is the junior tranche to default 
and the losses rip through the mezzanine and end up 
destroying the senior tranche. Once again it stands or 
falls together, this time through contagion rather than 
correlation, but the principle is the same.
 What will cause the CDO to implode? Exactly the 
austerity policies Germany demands of everyone else, 
which as we now see, have slowed growth in Germany’s 
main markets and reciprocally, in Germany itself, to a 
standstill. All this will do is make bondholders more 
nervous and the German response will be the same – 
more austerity. Europe has reached a point where its 
collective bank exposures threaten to be bigger than its 
collective bailout capacity. 
 Given the real consequences of the crisis in the 
periphery for German growth prospects, it is time for 
the German government to abandon the blame and 
austerity line.  Instead, Merkel needs to commit to a 
new politics of European solidarity (Newman 2010). 
She must educate her electorate about the German 
contribution to the Eurozone crisis and convince them 
that it is their responsibility to back faltering European 
partners. At the same time, a grand strategy centered 
on European solidarity could send a signal to market 
actors who have come to doubt the policy capacity of 
the Union and possibly forestall further contagion effects. 
It has come to the point where moral hazard must be 
sacrificed on the altar of hegemonic stability.   
Mark Blyth, Brown University
Abraham Newman, Georgetown University 
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Beware of German Fragility
Tobias Schulze-Cleven
 “If the stakes were not so high,” The Economist 
recently wrote, “Europeans’ incompetence in the euro-
zone debt crisis would be comic.” No doubt the situation 
is dire, and many observers are rightly pointing their 
fingers at Germany. Europe’s largest economy has 
been reluctant to take on the responsibilities associ-
ated with being the continent’s effective hegemon. As 
a result, Germany’s half-hearted actions have contrib-
uted to turning the sovereign debt problems of a few 
small countries – Greece, Ireland and Portugal – into a 
full-blown European crisis with severe unemployment, 
austerity policies and protests in the streets.
 Under German tutelage, the European Union has 
taken a series of small, reactive steps whose parsimony 
and lateness have failed to reduce market uncertainty. 
Current plans for the mid-2013 transfer of the temporary 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) into the 
permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) are 
symptomatic. While European leaders have promised to 
protect private investors from losses through sovereign 
debt restructuring for the period of the EFSF’s existence, 
it is unrealistic that these conditions could simultane-
ously be honored under the EFSF and changed under 
the ESM. The lack of a credible long-term policy stance 
has allowed speculation about sovereign defaults to 
spread to Spain and Italy. Moreover, simple backward 
induction tells us that – ceteris paribus – France’s top 
credit rating will logically be questioned next, and then 
it will be on to Germany’s.
 European powerbrokers are increasingly appalled 
at German inaction. For instance, Luxembourg’s Jean-
Claude Juncker, who is the President of the Euro Group 
and the longest-serving EU head of government, openly 
charged the German government with “simple” thinking 
and “un-European” behavior after Chancellor Merkel 
“rejected” his Eurobond proposals. What is behind 
German thinking? Two interrelated perspectives can 
illuminate the drivers of German behavior. 
 A Marxist interpretation posits that governments are 
in the pocket of the financial oligarchy. Various potential 
mechanisms can combine to produce a tight coupling of 
capital and the state, including the effects of understaff-
ing in the public bureaucracy, the desire of key public 
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officials to ingratiate themselves with private-sector 
firms with whom they plan to later seek employment, 
a state’s mercantilist impulses, and the government’s 
fear of domestic economic instability. Seen through 
this lens, Germany’s support for the EFSF appears 
to have been oriented toward protecting the perfor-
mance of its financial sector. The EFSF has effectively 
ensured the continued servicing of the European debt 
held by Germany’s banks and insurance companies, 
while simultaneously allowing them to reduce their 
risk exposure and shift the potential losses associated 
with “problematic” bond investments onto European 
taxpayers. With the banks having by now sold off many 
of their precarious positions, the EFSF seems to have 
succeeded in stabilizing Germany’s banking industry. 
In turn, the German government has now been “freed” 
to embrace Deutsche Bank’s proposal for a “soft” re-
structuring of Greek debt so as to signal publically that 
private investors are contributing their “fair” share.
 A second approach highlights the schizophrenic 
reactions of a public that has been put through the neo-
liberal wringer. As illustrated by the widening of the euro-
zone’s trade imbalances over the last decade, there is 
no denying that Germany’s industrial exporters have 
greatly benefited from monetary integration in Europe. 
It has prevented the appreciation of the German cur-
rency vis-à-vis that of other European countries, while 
stimulating the demand for German goods in Southern 
Europe through its pro-cyclical effects. 
 Many Germans, however, experienced the last de-
cade quite differently. In combination with aggressive 
employers, “responsible” unions and reform-oriented 
politicians, the overly tight local monetary stance con-
tributed to depressing income growth, pushing up un-
employment and increasing economic insecurity. Over 
time, entirely legitimate popular discontent increased. 
However, just as in the United States, its expression has 
been channeled through the particular locally-dominant 
variant of prevailing liberal ideology. While the libertar-
ian heritage of rugged individualism acted as a filter 
that shaped the emergence of the American Tea Party 
movement, the German prism has been that of ordo-
liberalism, which has been credited with enabling the 
country’s postwar economic miracle and served as the 
inspiration behind Germany’s push for the euro-zone’s 
Stability and Growth Pact.  Politicians have reacted to 
this popular sentiment, and the widespread associated 
fear of Europe’s potential transformation into a “transfer-
union,” by emphasizing the importance of using the 
current crisis to get other European countries to pursue 
structural reforms and rein in their “fiscal profligacy.”
 While the first of these two stories remains largely 
hidden from public view, the latter features prominently 
in the political theater staged daily in the German 
media. What connects them is the reality of German 
domestic fragility. Before unification, the internal “semi-
sovereignty” of the German state appeared to support 
the country’s economic performance and to produce 
patterns of “reflexive multilateralism” in international 
affairs. Since then, however, state weakness has taken 
its toll, and the perceived strength has become a li-
ability.  Unable to impose the costs of unification and 
economic adjustment on a strong corporatist society, 
the state’s welfare institutions have been hollowed out 
and its debt burden has sharply increased.  This do-
mestic institutional exhaustion has acted as a negative 
externality that has constrained German policy toward 
the European Union.
 At the time of writing, the further outlook remains 
uncertain. The German government’s proposed pact 
for competitiveness seeks to increase European-level 
coordination of national policies, but it falls short of func-
tioning as a genuine European game-changer that could 
compensate for the pro-cyclical effects of a common 
monetary policy. At the same time, German opposition 
to the idea of Eurobonds seems to be softening. For 
better or for worse, the German government will keep 
things exciting for scholars of the European Union.
Tobias Schulze-Cleven, University of Bamberg
The New Parochialism: Germany’s Inward Turn 
and the European Economic Crisis
Mark Vail
 In the 1990s, many observers questioned whether 
Germany, having tackled the challenge of reunification, 
could become a “normal country.”  This formulation 
evoked a Germany willing to pursue its own interests 
at home and abroad, no longer forced to bury them in 
multilateral garb or to accompany each assertion with a 
qualifier about the consistency of its interests with those 
of Europe and the wider world. With some exceptions, 
most held that the new, post-reunification Germany 
would behave much like the old, “remain[ing] committed 
to multilateralism”  and, when forced to choose, making 
its interests subordinate to the trans-Atlantic and Euro-
pean structures to which it owed its post-World-War-II 
rehabilitation and its successful return to the community 
of nations.
 Germany’s reactions to the post-2007 economic 
crisis, and particularly to the so-called European “sov-
ereign debt crisis,” show that these predictions missed 
the mark, but not in the ways that some in the 1990s had 
feared. At the time, such skeptics predicted an increas-
ingly aggressive Germany, willing to flex its economic 
muscles in the pursuit of geopolitical ends, even at the 
cost of its European neighbors.  Instead, during the 
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past four years, Germany has turned inward, severing 
the time-honored link between national and multilateral 
interests and willing to adopt a parochial stance when 
the concomitance between national interest and multi-
lateral packaging began to erode. This has resulted in 
inconsistency and even hypocrisy among Germany’s 
leaders, as they struggle to maintain the veneer of the 
national-cum-multilateral model in the wake of daunting 
circumstances.  But the trend is clear: Germany has 
often thrown multilateralism overboard when it conflicts 
with elite preferences and public opinion, real or imag-
ined.  Rather than the aggressive Germany that some 
observers in the 1990s feared, the past four years have 
witnessed the emergence of a different Germany, still an 
economic giant but also a country that has replaced an 
optimistic cosmopolitanism with a sometimes churlish 
parochialism as its dominant key.
 Though this identity crisis has been visible in a 
number of domestic policy arenas, such as the adoption 
of a major Keynesian stimulus package in 2008-2009 
that dared not speak its name,  nowhere has it been 
more visible, and more damaging to both itself and 
its allies, than in the ongoing European liquidity and 
banking crisis.  Notwithstanding its sometimes stun-
ning amateurishness in negotiating a series of halting 
and inadequate bailouts for Greece (and now, it seems 
likely, for other European countries, as well), Germany 
has adopted a relatively consistent, if broken, policy 
line: protect German banks and other holders of debt 
in fiscally shaky European countries such as Ireland, 
Greece, Portugal, and Spain, insist on imposing crush-
ing austerity regimes on countries that are targets of 
bond-market speculation and fiscal imbalances, and re-
sist the adoption of any measure that might suggest col-
lective European responsibility for Europe’s economic 
welfare or any loosening of Europe’s masochistic hard-
currency regime.  This line has been pursued even as 
Germany has denied or ignored the fact that Germany’s 
massive trade surplus was funded in part by Spanish, 
Greek, Portuguese, Italian, and Irish consumers (among 
others), in part with money lent by German banks in the 
form of purchases of those countries’ sovereign debt. 
It is also important to recall that one of Germany’s pri-
mary interests in agreeing to European Economic and 
Monetary Union—the same set of institutions on whose 
deflationary altar Greek, Irish, and Spanish workers 
are now being sacrificed—and the way that the project 
was sold to a skeptical Germany public—was boosting 
German competitiveness by bundling up the Deutsche 
Mark with other currencies in order to dampen the prices 
of German goods in other European markets.
 Germany’s recent behavior suggests that the 
country of former Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign 
Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, deeply committed 
to multilateralism and careful to balance Germany’s 
interests against those of its European allies, is a thing 
of the past.  The advent of the financial and economic 
crisis in 2007-2008, and the resulting exposure of the 
unworkable deflationary bargain at the heart of EMU, 
which many EMU member states are now unable eco-
nomically to cope with or politically to accept, confronted 
Germany with a stark choice: either lead by full-throated 
example and support European institutions, even at 
the price of imposing costs on German taxpayers and 
diluting EMU’s monetarist character, or sacrifice its 
commitment to EMU except to the extent that it contin-
ues to serve Germany’s economic interests as a large, 
high-skilled, export-driven economy.  Germany chose 
the latter.  For decades, Germany had profited from 
both Europe’s political structures, which gave it political 
legitimacy and allowed it to rehabilitate its international 
image, and economic structures, which supported its 
export-based prosperity, and so it is surprising that it 
has been so willing to abandon these commitments 
with the economic tide turned.  To be sure, some of 
the small-mindedness of Germany’s response can be 
ascribed to Angela Merkel’s weakness as a leader in 
time of crisis, her limited understanding of economics, 
and her sometimes stunning acceptance of clichés 
about southern Europeans being lazy and shiftless.   To 
be fair, one must also recognize that Merkel’s CDU is 
forced to deal with an ideologically strident and inflex-
ible FDP coalition partner with a monomaniacal interest 
in tax cuts.  But it is hard not to sense that something 
broader and more durable has happened to Germany’s 
commitment to multilateralism and its associated po-
litical identity.  One can only imagine what Genscher 
must be thinking. If Germany is still a model, then it 
has become a model of a very different kind than that 
imagined by the country’s post-war leaders.  Whether 
it has become a durable European “problem” is as yet 
unclear, but the evidence to date is not encouraging.
Mark Vail, Tulane University
Germany’s Puzzling Response to the Eurozone 
Crisis: The obstinate defense of Ordnungspolitik
Brigitte Young
 Financial panic is spreading like wildfire across the 
globe. On August 8th 2011, the markets registered the 
biggest stock market plunge (on average 5 percent) 
since 2008 across Europe, Asia and the United States, 
only to swing back and recoup some of the losses the 
next day. Instead of calming the markets with credible 
policy responses to the public and private debt crisis, 
the world’s political leaders further unsettle the markets 
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by blaming each other for lack of leadership. Europeans 
accuse American political leaders for their ideological 
stand-off in raising the debt ceiling, thus provoking a 
historical downgrade of US Treasuries, and Americans 
blame Euro-leaders for their lack of policy coordination 
and their insistence on austerity rules to solve the sov-
ereign debt crisis. China’s unusually terse criticism of 
America’s handling of its huge debt is a further reminder 
that political leaders disagree on what needs to be done 
to solve the financial crisis. In the process the crisis gets 
bigger and more expensive at each new turn of market 
panic.
 Despite the latest agreement reached among the 
European leaders on 21st July 2011 to shore up con-
fidence in the Eurozone by doubling the emergency 
fund to Greece, lowering the interest rates of indebted 
countries, permitting the European Financial Stability 
Facility to buy government bonds on the open market, 
and including private investors in debt agreements, 
exactly the opposite happened. The much feared 
contagion has now engulfed Cyprus, borrowing costs 
for Italy and Spain have increased to over 6 percent in 
early August, and France has also been caught up in the 
turmoil having to pay a premium above that of Germany. 
According to Kenneth Rogoff, it is not economics as 
much as the lack of credibility of policy leaders who are 
disconnected from reality that unsettle the markets. This 
disconnection is no more apparent than in Germany. 
 Angela Merkel saw no rush to cut short her summer 
hiking vacation in Trentino-South Tirol in August. While 
some pundits applaud her calmness in the eye of the 
storm, others call her policies towards the sovereign 
crisis as “Merkel’s Folly” (Jones 2010). The follies 
include a lack of leadership, an inability to understand 
the global bond markets, her concern with domestic 
politics, and her insistence on fiscal discipline to cure 
the plight of indebted countries. Speculations vary as 
to the Chancellor’s behavior. Explanations range from 
personal attributes (such as Merkel’s academic train-
ing as a physicist, her distrust of markets and her trust 
in rules), to generational changes (from the wartime 
generation to a Post-World War II generation having 
no personal experience with war), to the constraints of 
domestic politics (including frequent election cycles, 
the conservative German Constitutional Court, voter 
concern with fiscal prudence, and the strong populist 
media outcry against using tax payers’ money for any 
rescue efforts) (Young/Semmler 2011; Young 2011). 
 Yet all these explanations share one common 
characterization of the System Merkel: the belief in a 
rule-based system, which is the hallmark of German 
ordoliberalism. The belief in setting rules and then let 
the market forces work is shared by German econo-
mists, bankers, and politicians alike. This is in stark 
contrast to the French notion of a politicized discre-
tionary macroeconomic governance at the European 
level (Jabko 2010). While the critics of Germany cite 
the slow, fragmented, uncoordinated response of An-
gela Merkel, she and her economic advisors see the 
EMU as a depoliticized rule-based system based on 
Treaties, which need to be strengthened in order for 
the markets to work efficiently.  That Germany violated 
the Stability and Growth Pact (with France) in 2003 is 
only one more reason for Merkel to continue to insist 
on automatic penalties for any violators of fiscal rules. 
German economists and Central Bankers abhor the 
idea of turning the European Central Bank into a bailout 
regime. This would, as Otmar Issing (2011) warns, start 
down a slippery road to a regime of fiscal indiscipline 
and threatens the “most successful project of economic 
integration in the history of mankind”. 
 Setting rules and letting markets operate freely 
may work in normal times, but the theory may break 
down in times of irrational global financial markets. The 
problem does not lie with Angela Merkel or Germany’s 
obstinate refusal to  bail out  indebted countries. It is the 
result of ordoliberalism which is the undisputed school 
of economic thought in every economics department 
at German universities.  
Brigitte Young, University of Münster
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EU Law Interest Section
The Emerging History of European Law
Bill Davies*
 The European Union is, as students of all forms 
of European integration know, a product of the law. 
Since its humble origin as a limited union of six national 
coal and steel industries in the 1950s, its development 
has been greatly shaped by its uniquely authoritative 
Court of Justice (ECJ).  The ECJ’s jurisprudence and 
decision-making has established a European legal 
order that is, compared to international law, coher-
ent, effective and enjoys a significant impact on the 
national legal systems.  European citizens, firms and 
judiciaries, empowered by the structures of recourse 
to the ECJ, supply the court with thousands of refer-
rals for preliminary rulings each year.  The case law 
of the court creates ‘integration-through-law, pushing 
the development of policy fields hitherto blocked by 
recalcitrant governments.  We need only to think of 
the extensive competition policy or the area of equal 
pay as examples.  The ECJ has placed itself on top of 
this system, akin to a federal and constitutional court, 
in some ways attempting to emulate its counterpart in 
the United States.  
 The ECJ laid the groundwork for this quasi-consti-
tutional order in two judgments in the early 1960s – the 
now famous Van Gend en Loos and Costa vs. E.N.E.L 
decisions of 1963 and 1964 respectively.  The court then 
built on the direct effect and supremacy jurisprudence 
over the subsequent decades in case law familiar to 
all of us.  Despite its modest beginnings in the Trea-
ties of Paris and Rome, the ECJ had now – or so the 
conventional interpretation, espoused by scholars such 
as Joseph Weiler and Eric Stein, argues – ‘constitution-
alized’ the Treaties and secured the rule of law in the 
Community.  Without the acquiescence and coopera-
tion of national courts these doctrines might have been 
empty gestures given the striking lack of a constitutional 
mandate for the ECJ in the original treaties.  Over time, 
however, national judiciaries have by and large come 
to accept the practical consequences of the decisions. 
In most Member States, this reception process has 
taken decades with the highest national courts offer-
ing particularly stiff and, in some cases – Germany, for 
instance - continuing resistance.  What is all the more 
remarkable is that this initial legal revolution took place 
in a period of European integration (1963-1965) that is 
traditionally characterized by the demise of the federal-
ist ambitions of the European Commission, personified 
in its president Walter Hallstein, and the rise of the 
Member States as the key veto-holding protagonists in 
the Community system.  How did the ECJ manage to 
do this?  Did it slip under the radar of the governments 
and their populaces, pushing through legal integra-
tion while most were concerned with completing the 
Common Market and dealing with De Gaulle?  Did the 
revolution have supporters outside the court?  How 
have scholars explained the apparent success of the 
ECJ in driving forward legal integration?  There seems 
to be a wealth of questions relating the evolution of the 
European legal order that legal historians are only now 
attempting to answer.  
 That archival documents are becoming available 
and historiographical work is now beginning is an 
important development on scholarship on EU law and 
the court.  Until now, attempts to explain the growth in 
influence of the court have come predominately from 
the ECJ itself, or from legal and political scientists.  ECJ 
judges and officials have been prolific in justifying its 
most ambitious and contested doctrines, claiming the 
court has defended the rule of law against the short-
sighted or self-interested intrusions of the Member 
States.  The well-known works of Robert Lecourt and 
Pierre Pescatore stand out as prime examples.  The 
‘constitutionalization’ school, promoted famously by the 
works of Eric Stein and Joseph Weiler in the 1980s, 
actually fortified the foundational story promulgated by 
the ECJ.  They argue that the ECJ did indeed ‘consti-
tutionalize’ the Treaties of Rome successfully, creating 
a European legal order that, measured on most pa-
rameters, is similar to the constitutional legal order of 
a federal polity.  Although national administrations and 
high courts have certainly contested this to an extent, 
their ultimate acquiescence has seen the establishment 
of a rule of law in the European Union.  While this con-
stitutional approach was quite prevalent by the early 
1990s, events such as the Maastricht Treaty, undermin-
ing legal unity by adding to two new intergovernmental 
pillars to the new Union, as well as the unwillingness 
of the German Constitutional Court to subject national 
constitutions to a supreme European law without demo-
cratic legitimacy in the famous Maastricht ruling led to a 
serious reassessment by legal scholars.  In the following 
decade the classic constitutional narrative diversified 
into numerous neo-constitutional takes on the nature 
of European law, creating a huge volume of legal and 
political science scholarship of great sophistication. 
This scholarship focused on other factors explaining 
the remarkable development of European law.  The 
Realist approach, exemplified by Geoffrey Garrett, 
emphasized the strategic political game played by the 
ECJ in facilitating the interests of the largest Member 
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States.  Subsequently, the Neo-Functionalist focused 
on the conscious self-empowerment of the ECJ, work-
ing in alliances of shared interests with sub-national 
actors, such as lower national courts or litigants.  Much 
of the best scholarship in this particular area has been 
authored by Karen Alter, Alex Stone Sweet, Anne-Marie 
Slaughter and Walter Mattli.   Despite its search for other 
explanations for the court’s growth, this scholarship was 
and is overwhelmingly written within the Stein-Weiler 
constitutionalisation paradigm.
 Most recently, a number of new methodological 
approaches have emerged that have attempted to 
shed new light on the development of the EU’s legal 
order.  In some cases, there are the first signs of dissent 
against constitutionalism itself.  It has been argued by 
Danish historian, Morten Rasmussen, for instance, that 
it constitutes a fundamental misrepresentation of the 
history of European law and originated as a legitimat-
ing strategy of the ECJ.  In a similar dissenting vein, 
Will Phelan has emphasized the special, sui-generis 
‘self-contained’ nature of Europe as an international 
organization.  A new Bourdieu-infused sociology of law 
has emerged concomitantly claiming that the process 
of constitutionalisation should rather be considered a 
classic process of judicialization, through which jurists 
have managed to empower themselves and their 
socio-legal capital through the European construction. 
Writers in this area include Antoine Vauchez, Mikael 
Risk Madsen and Antonin Cohen.  Likewise, Peter 
Lindseth, a legal scholar with a doctorate in European 
history, has recently published a highly important, ma-
jor interdisciplinary synthesis, Power and Legitimacy: 
Reconciling Europe and the Nation State, arguing that 
European integration constitutes a new stage in the rise 
of the administrative state after the Second World War, 
in which regulatory power is defused and fragmented 
‘away from the constituted bodies of representative 
government at the national level, to an administrative 
sphere that now operates both within and beyond the 
state’. In this synthesis, the attempt to establish a con-
stitutional practice by the ECJ went against the very 
nature of European law and is among the key sources 
of tension in the contested legitimacy of the European 
Union. 
 In this field of competing interpretations, the actual 
historical work completed on European law is still mas-
sively underdeveloped.  Thus far, the huge degree of 
theoretical sophistication offered by the explanations 
outlined above is still undermined by their relatively 
weak empirical foundations.  The legal and social 
science models are based on secondary sources, 
retrospective interviews and judicial decision-making 
theory taken from the experiences of other legal sys-
tems.  Only in the last five years or so has a new wave 
of legal historians emerged, who after spending long 
and fruitful periods of study in national and European 
archives, are able to offer a healthy dose of detail, nu-
ance and documented fact to test the models so long 
established in the field.  The first findings of the legal 
historians emerged in the Journal of European Integra-
tion History in late 2008.  The forthcoming publication of 
a special edition of the Contemporary European History 
journal will serve to broaden and deepen the scope of 
current historical scholarship.  Furthermore, the forth-
coming book by Bill Davies, entitled Resisting the ECJ: 
Germany’s Struggle with European Law, will be the first 
monograph in this new trend.  This new history not only 
revisits the models explaining the ECJ’s evolution, but 
also redresses an imbalance in existing scholarship on 
the EU.  Historians of European integration have by and 
large ignored or underplayed the important role played 
by the ECJ.  The most prominent historians of European 
integration – Alan S. Milward, Wilfried Loth, Michel Du-
moulin, Gerard Bossuat, N. Piers Ludlow and Wolfram 
Kaiser – have certainly been aware of the court and its 
influence, but it is has never been their central object 
of attention.  The politics and economics of European 
integration have, perhaps understandably, dominated 
its historiography.  Law has been the junior partner in 
the story of the EU so far, but this looks to be changing 
in the near future.   
Bill Davies, American University
*Special thanks to Morten Rasmussen (University of 
Copenhagen) for his contribution to this piece.
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is addressed by Peter Kunzlik; eco-labelling issues are 
examined by Dan Wilsher; CSR in the utility sector is 
outlined by Sue Arrowsmith and Colin Maund; exclu-
sion for serious criminal offence is illustrated by Sope 
Williams. 
 In the introductory chapters, a new term for the 
inclusion of social and environmental policies in EC 
procurement law is first developed: horizontal policies. 
In contrast to the term “secondary policies”, this new 
term elucidates that horizontal policies in procurement 
law should have equal status with other governmental 
policies. Another term and category that is introduced 
in the book is the distinction between the government 
as a regulator and the government as a purchaser. 
Implicitly both categories are already used in the Euro-
pean procurement law. The editors argue that the goal 
of European procurement law is to create an internal 
market. Therefore the autonomy of the public and pri-
vate purchasers should only be restricted when there 
are special reasons to do so, such as the tendency of 
governmental purchaser to favor national industry and 
thereby to interfere with the internal market. Generally, 
the European procurement regime protects the internal 
market through three different mechanisms: prohibiting 
discrimination, requiring transparent procedures and 
removing certain market restrictions. As saving public 
expenditure and improving the quality of services does 
not contribute to the creation of an internal market per 
se, the authors come to the conclusion that this is not 
one of the goals of the European procurement law. 
From a legal analysis point of view they argue that the 
European law gives a wide discretion to the Member 
States for pursuing horizontal policies.
 The contribution of this book is to provide a 
framework and taxonomy for future analysis that has 
not previously been offered. It presents a good over-
view over the various legal problems in this area. Dif-
ferent views about the “new directions” for European 
procurement law are offered. Unfortunately, chapters 
five to twelve, dealing with different topics in the area 
of horizontal policies in public procurement like the 
procurement of green energy, do not always refer ex-
plicitly to the outlined analytical framework. In sum, I find 
this book to be a very valuable description of the legal 
problems and political potentials arising from social and 
environmental considerations in procurement law.
Rike U. Krämer, University Bremen
Sue Arrowsmith and Peter Kunzlik (eds.). Social and 
Environmental Policies in EC Procurement Law: New 
Directives and New Directions. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009.
 Public procurement is the process by which 
government bodies purchase goods and services from 
the private market. Starting in the mid-1990s, the use 
of public procurement to promote social and environ-
mental goals, for example by not buying from suppliers 
that use child labor, or by purchasing green energy, 
has been highly debated in the European Union. At 
the beginning, the European Commission, as well as 
most of the Member States, has been very skeptical 
about so called “secondary policies“ in procurement law. 
Up until now, the skepticism regarding social goals in 
procurement law is highly vivid as can be seen in the 
debate about the case Rüffert v. Land Niedersachsen 
(C- 346/06) and the handbook of the European Com-
mission “Buying social: A guide to taking account of 
social considerations in public procurement”. “Green 
procurement“ on the other hand has become a goal in 
itself at the European level.
 This edited volume elaborates on the current 
legal status of these two goals in European procure-
ment law. Social and environmental considerations 
in procurement law are potential barriers to trade. 
The book addresses the question of how the balance 
between free trade and the desire of national govern-
ments to use procurement as a policy tool is drawn or 
should be drawn. One part of the question examines the 
extent to which the European law, especially the new 
(2004) directives, limits the discretion of the Member 
States. Subject to the other part is the extent to which 
the European law requires or encourages the Member 
States to use their procurement power to promote the 
two goals. The general aim of the book is not to provide 
a comprehensive account of the law but to elaborate 
new legal developments. 
 The book is organized into twelve chapters.Four 
general chapters discuss social and environmental 
policies in European procurement law written by Sue 
Arrowsmith and Peter Kunzlik. In the remaining eight 
chapters special legal questions within these field are 
addressed: Hans Joachim Priess and Moritz Graf von 
Merveldt examine the impact of EU state aid rules on 
horizontal policies; equality issues in EU procurement 
law are addressed by Christopher McCrudden; Rose-
mary Boyle deals with disability issues; the promotion 
of SMEs is examined by Nicholas Hatzis; green energy 
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Alter, Karen J. The European Court’s Political Power. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
 Karen J. Alter, one of the most prolific authors in 
transnational judicial politics, has been studying the 
European Court of Justice for two decades. Her latest 
book collects the various fruits of this research that 
were previously only accessible in different journals 
and collections. Although the chapters – some of which 
are co-authored, some slightly revised – stand for 
themselves, taken together, they tell a common story 
about “how the ECJ became a political actor that was 
capable of transforming European and international 
politics” (3). Readers familiar with Alter’s writings will 
want to have a look at the introduction and conclusion 
in which the author draws more general lessons and 
outlines a research agenda for the future. They will 
also be interested in reading the newly written fourth 
chapter on the role of “jurist advocacy movements in 
Europe”. All others will find a remarkably creative and 
stringently argued analysis. The organization of the 
book follows from a historical logic, beginning with the 
founding moments of European legal integration and 
ending with the more recent developments.
 Section one contains the introduction and a brief 
and useful primer summarizing the evolution of ECJ 
scholarship and explaining the ECJ rulings that have 
transformed EU primary law into a constitution for Eu-
rope. According to the overarching narrative, spelled 
out in the introduction, the ECJ became influential 
by strategically and cautiously allying with domestic 
actors to encourage respect for European law. The 
most relevant factors are thus exogenous to the ECJ. 
Indeed, simply replicating the ECJ’s institutional design 
is not enough for other international courts to become 
effective vis-à-vis recalcitrant governments. The court’s 
own agency as well as its activation and support by 
societal actors are key. The introduction also situates 
Alter’s work within the somewhat dated battle between 
neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. Between 
the devil and the deep blue sea, Alter chooses neither. 
Instead, she confesses a preference for historical insti-
tutionalism (HI). Whether this means that she proposes 
HI as yet another contender or whether in fact she joins 
in the now popular farewell song to all paradigmatic 
debates in favour of “sometimes-true” theories and 
“analytic frameworks” depends on the status she attests 
to HI – a question that is left open.
 The chapters of the second section seek to explain 
the transformation of the ECJ from a weak and inef-
fectual actor to the Supreme Court in all but name of 
an integrated EU legal system. Chapter three examines 
the point of origin. Why was the ECJ so weak during 
the ECSC period? Part of the answer is that neither 
member states nor societal actors were interested in a 
truly integrated coal and steel market. Contrary to the 
idea that legal integration is strongest during political 
paralysis, the ECJ refrained from aggressive rulings in 
this period and left practically no imprint. But while the 
ECJ was timid in the ECSC, it was bold in the early 
EEC. In the newly written fourth chapter, Alter takes 
another look at this period of legal revolution, thereby 
putting into perspective both the legalist story according 
to which the ECJ simply “discovered” the supremacy 
and direct effect of EU law, and the neofunctionalist idea 
that lawyers and litigants through their individual usage 
of the preliminary ruling procedure set the process in 
motion. The chapter shows how a network of prestigious 
Euro-law scholars and ECJ judges actively orchestrated 
their efforts to construct a “hegemonic constitutional nar-
rative”. This new, Bourdieusian interpretation is in part 
also a revision of Alter’s own prior analysis, reprinted in 
chapter five, which essentially drew on a structural argu-
ment. The main claim being that the preliminary ruling 
system in conjunction with the doctrines of supremacy 
and direct effect created an opportunity for lower courts 
to side-step higher courts and thereby facilitated the 
penetration of EU law into national law. Why did national 
governments not intervene? The section’s last chapter 
refutes claims based on principal-agent theory that the 
major rulings basically reflect the interests of Paris and 
Berlin. Indeed, the Court camouflaged far-reaching doc-
trinal innovations in politically innocuous rulings and it 
bred allies in national courts. When the full implications 
of its new doctrines became manifest, it was too late to 
turn the wheel around.
 The third section asks when and how the ECJ will 
influence political outcomes. Social support is the cru-
cial enabling factor. Chapter seven examines the Cassis 
decision, famous for developing the principle of mutual 
recognition. It argues that the ruling neither reflected 
the interests of powerful member-states, nor can it be 
seen as creation of mutual recognition by supranational 
fiat. Instead, what Alter calls “political follow-through” is 
key: “ECJ decisions affect policy by helping to mobilize 
interests in support or opposition of the law, and then by 
provoking political responses” (17). If “follow-through” 
is needed to implement judgments, what are the pre-
conditions for activating the European legal system in 
the first place? Analyzing the successful legal challenge 
to British gender policy, chapter eight identifies several 
“thresholds”. Transnational variation in court activation, 
it is argued, can be accounted for by the difficulty of 
surmounting these thresholds, which in turn depends 
on (Olsonian) cost-benefit distributions and domestic 
institutional factors. EU law is not a “one-way ratchet” 
leading to an ever-closer union. According to chapter 
nine, the thresholds model implies that “national and 
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EU legal systems can also be used by private litigants 
to challenge advances in European integration” (211). 
Some examples for such a legal backlash are cited, but 
they still seem few and far between. The final chapter 
of this section examines the international constraints 
of judicial law making. Using the WTO banana trade 
dispute as example, the chapter is an elaborate treat-
ment of the complex interrelation between different legal 
regimes on several levels of governance.
 The final section puts the ECJ in comparison. Alter 
first presents her comparative framework, in chapter 
eleven. Here, she moves her previous critique of prin-
cipal-agent analyses onto a more theoretical plane. The 
chapter contrasts the two-sided relationship between 
agent (court) and principals (governments) with the 
three-sided “trustee” relationship, where a third actor, 
called the “beneficiary” changes the constellation: Gov-
ernments as well as the court, understood as “trustee” 
rather than “agent”, want to convince the “beneficiary” 
that their decision is in the public’s best interest. This 
shapes the politics among courts and governments: 
Rhetorical and legitimacy politics are more important 
than sanctioning and shirking. The next chapter asks 
for the differences that make the ECJ stand out. Why 
is it more active and more influential than other inter-
national courts? Interestingly, the most salient factor, 
access for private litigants, is no longer rare among 
“new style” international courts. Indeed, by comparing 
the ECJ with its carbon-copy, the Court of Justice of 
the Andean Community, Alter argues that it is not the 
institutional design per se that matters, but rather the 
socio-political environment, because it shapes the ac-
tual usage of access. On the other hand, institutional 
design is not primarily driven by bargains about the 
delegation of power but by functional considerations. 
This sophisticated argument opens the way for com-
parisons with domestic courts, which also have different 
functions – administrative review, civil law adjudication 
etc. – and concomitant design features.
 The conclusion of the book spells out lessons for 
the future study of international courts. The ECJ’s suc-
cess story is seen as part of a more encompassing 
development in European history, in which courts in 
particular, and the rule of law in general have gained 
importance after the Second World War. For the study 
of European legal integration, Alter therefore advocates 
a larger research agenda, connecting European level 
changes to national evolutions.
 This message suggests an orientation towards 
historical research, even towards the history of ideas. 
It is in line with Alter’s preference for complexity over 
parsimony. There is, as she notes “no set of unidirec-
tional hypotheses that predicts when, why, and how the 
ECJ will be activist or influential” (4). It also suits her 
frequent use of counterfactual analysis (would history 
been different if…?) and her preference for diachronic 
single-case studies. In addition to the fascinating 
substantive output, a methodological retrospection of 
Alter’s research would have been interesting to read. 
Another blind spot is the normative evaluation of the 
ECJ’s development and of how it transformed the EU 
legal system. What for some is akin to a coup d’état, 
others embrace as civil-rights empowerment. Alter’s is 
a positive analysis but it cannot escape this question. 
Not least when the author considers how the European 
“success” can be transplanted to other international 
courts, she implicitly takes a (cosmopolitan) normative 
stand. The “trustee” model in which court and govern-
ments justify their decisions in front of the “beneficiary”, 
a public audience, potentially offers a fruitful framework 
also for normative theorizing. Yet it is always easy to 
criticize a book for what it is not rather than appreci-
ate it for what it is: An impressive journey through two 
decades of ECJ scholarship that nobody interested in 
EU politics and international legal studies can afford 
to miss.
Henning Deters, University of Bremen
Andreas Dür. Protection for Exporters: Power and 
Discrimination in Transatlantic Trade Relations, 1930-
2010. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010.
 Protection for Exporters is a history of 20th-century 
transatlantic trade liberalization centered on a set 
of hypotheses on the export lobby. Andreas Dür is 
professor of international politics at the University of 
Salzburg. In this work he explains the dynamics of the 
transatlantic trade policies through the testing of the 
following five hypotheses on the key role of exporters 
in trade negotiations:
1. The mobilization hypothesis: Exporters 
increase their lobbying efforts whenever they 
face losses in foreign market access resulting 
from the formation (or the amplification) of a 
preferential trading arrangement among foreign 
countries.
2. The influence hypothesis: The stronger 
the lobbying efforts of exporters, the more 
concerned a government should be about the 
protection of exporter interests, while continu-
ing to cater to those import competitors that 
engage in lobbying.
3. The choice of strategy hypothesis: The more 
vulnerable a country, the more likely it is to of-
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fer concessions to the member countries of a 
preferential agreement to maintain access for 
its exporters (“preferential access” and “non-
discriminatory access” strategies), and the 
less likely it is to threaten others with retaliatory 
measures (“threat” strategy) or to join a rival 
agreement (“rival agreement” strategy).
4. The bargaining-power hypothesis: The mobi-
lization of exporters excludes the government of 
a country from a trade agreement and forces it to 
accept a balance of concessions in an exchange 
of market access with member countries that it 
would have rejected given the prior balance of 
domestic interests.
5. The member-country hypothesis. The will-
ingness of the member countries of a prefer-
ential agreement to conclude an agreement 
with excluded countries increases to the same 
degree that their ability to extract concessions 
increases.” (p. 49)
 The analysis and the results of Protection for 
Exporters are organized into an introduction, a first 
chapter on the “protection for exporters” argument and, 
in the following six other chapters on the dynamics of 
the transatlantic trade policies, the following: Imperial 
Preference and US Reaction, 1932-1947; Deadlock 
in Transatlantic Trade Negotiations, 1948-1957; The 
European Economic Community, Discrimination and 
Transatlantic Trade Relations, 1958-1963; The First 
Enlargement of the European Community and US Re-
action; The Single Market Programme and Transatlantic 
Trade Policies in the 1980s; Competition Between the 
EU and the US for Markets, 1995-2010.
 Dür’s book develops some highly original points of 
view, bridging American and the European trade poli-
cies while skilfully balancing chronology and detailed 
analysis with general arguments, mixing empirical and 
qualitative approaches. Worth mentioning also is the 
work is written by a European scholar not focusing on 
a regional subject but on transatlantic relations. Protec-
tion for Exporters is keenly interesting for contemporary 
economic history, for the international political economy, 
for trade policies and for the political analysis of lobby-
ing.
 The proliferation of trade agreements, the US and 
EU bilateral trade policy relations are to be regarded 
with a fresh eye after Dür’s approach on the subjects. 
Since 1945, the trade policy liberalization has been 
driven by fear of discrimination in foreign markets and 
the need for governments to protect exporters. Policy-
makers negotiate trade agreements as a means of 
protecting their exporters and of maximizing their bar-
gaining power. The exporter lobbying against foreign 
discrimination provides a key motivation for reciprocal 
trade liberalization on both sides of the Atlantic. Pro-
tection for Exporters is of serious interest to political 
scientists and economists who study preferential trading 
areas and global cooperation.
Ferran Brunet, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona 
 
Giandomenico Majone. Europe as the World-be 
World Power: The EU at Fifty. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009.  
 The European Union has become too big, too het-
erogeneous, and too unpopular. In his new book, Gi-
andomenico Majone seeks to understand how this sorry 
state of affairs was produced, and what can be done 
about it before it is too late. The problem, according to 
him, is that “in a steadily expanding Union the idea of 
straight-line evolution of the system is not only increas-
ingly implausible but also a serious obstacle to future 
integration.” The solution is to be found in the economic 
theory of clubs, which “shows that in an expanding polity 
the multiplication of voluntary associations tends to be 
welfare enhancing.” (p. 222)  
 Pitched at the crossroads of positive political sci-
ence and interpretive history, and then of large-scale 
history and policy-focused analytic narrative, Majone’s 
book can be read at several different levels. What no 
reader will miss, however, is the distinctively critical 
tone the book adopts towards the views and practices 
of “euro-elites”, “non-detached observers”, and other 
EU “fundamentalists”. The book’s four main points can 
be summarized as follows: (1) The implicit operational 
principles of European integration heretofore were (a) 
the absolute priority of centralized integration over all 
other goals and values, (b) “cryptofederalists’” contempt 
for mass politics, and (c) the Union’s engagement in 
permanent, centripetal movement; (2) These implicit 
operational principles are both severely challenged as 
a matter of fact, and wrong from a normative point of 
view; (3) Point 2 above notwithstanding, political and 
academic elites stick to these operational principles, 
either because they are well served by them, or because 
they are true European ideologues; and (4) The way out 
of the current mess does not consist in eliminating the 
so-called democratic deficit of the EU, but in correct-
ing the political markets which allow Member States to 
enter mutually beneficial exchanges.  
 The bulk of the book is then dedicated to an inter-
pretive/historical explanation of how the operational 
principles of the EU became so dominant (chapters 2 
and 3), how they have failed, both the systemic (insti-
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tutional) level, and the policy-specific level (chapters 4, 
5, and 7), and how the combined effects of the three 
operational principles of crypto-federalism have finally 
led to a “revolt of the masses” against the stealthy Com-
munity Method (chapters 1 and 6). Chapter 8 proposes 
differentiated integration as a solution: whereas the EU 
took a seemingly unavoidable path leading it from a 
club of 6 to a mess of 27, national governments should 
be left free to re-create several clubs of 6 (or 5 or 7, or 
whatever number sustains welfare-enhancing political 
exchanges).
 Giandomenico Majone’s book is, of course, worth 
reading, discussing, and comparing to other “big-
solution” works, such as Simon Hix’s (Hix 2008). First, 
it offers a succinct view of the process of European 
integration over the past 50 years (including current 
challenges) -- and often does so using refreshingly clear 
interpretive lenses. For example, the discussions of the 
political economy of EC competition law, of free move-
ment of goods and services, and of EMU all reflect high 
levels of expertise and analytical rigor. Second, Majone 
appeals to the economic theory of clubs to revive and 
consolidate the idea of differentiated integration as a 
solution to the problem of heterogeneous member state 
preferences. Like previous works of the same author 
(e.g. Majone 1996), this intuition can spark off a new 
research program. Third, this book clearly defines yet 
another phase in the thinking of one of the most innova-
tive thinkers of European politics.    
 Interesting and challenging as it may be, Majone’s 
argument is not always totally convincing. The appli-
cation of the economic theory of clubs to the current 
problems of the EU is certainly intriguing; nevertheless, 
it is still far from being a lot more than an intuition. First, 
as with all other applications of economic ideas to EU 
politics (e.g. concepts of principal-agent, of transaction 
cost economics, etc) the argument would benefit from 
drawing clear equivalences between economic theory 
and IR theory. For example, what does it mean to as-
sume that Member States behave like firms in competi-
tive markets? Which, if any, IR theories are compatible 
with such an assumption, and which are not? Second, 
as it stands, the theoretical argument is not yet logically 
complete. There is no exposition of who the relevant ac-
tors are, what their preferences look like, what the terms 
of their interactions may be, and what kind of falsifiable 
hypotheses such a model may produce. For example, 
the victory of the “cryptofederalists” (whoever this social 
group may include) over others is not explained as an 
equilibrium condition. Third, at least some of the ideas 
behind Majone’s proposed solution might have been 
tested empirically, if only with comparative case studies. 
After all, if the theory comes from economics, then one 
might also legitimately expect the method to do so, too. 
 A less important criticism may be addressed to 
Majone’s assertion that no extant literature deals with 
the causes and consequences of the EU’s operating 
principles in a dispassionate way. I believe, in contrast, 
that some of the best and most innovative work in EU 
politics has been done by scholars who dispassionately 
study the patterns of delegation to the EU, find important 
variations therein, and attempt to explain these using 
fully developed theoretical models (e.g. Franchino 
2007). Majone’s work should therefore not be read as 
the only book in its field, but as the big-picture comple-
ment to a series of more detailed studies.  
 Hopefully Majone will use his unique skills to more 
fully elaborate and test his “club” theory. In the mean-
while, this reviewer strongly recommends this book as 
essential reading for anyone interested in the big picture 
of EU politics.   
Yannis Karagiannis
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2012 EUSA Haas Fund Fellowship Competition 
 
The 2011-2013 EUSA Executive Committee is pleased to announce the 2012 EUSA Haas 
Fund Fellowship Competition, an annual fellowship for graduate student EU-related 
dissertation research. Thanks entirely to contributions to our Ernst Haas Memorial Fund for EU 
Studies, launched in June2003 to honor the memory of the late scholar Ernst B. Haas (1924-
2003) we will offer at least one unrestricted fellowship of $1,500 to support the dissertation 
research of any graduate student pursuing an EU-related dissertation topic in the academic 
year 2011-2012. 
 
Please note the following stipulations for applicants, who must: 
• be pursuing the doctoral degree (PhD) at an accredited institution in any country; 
• be writing a dissertation in English; 
• have an EU-related, doctoral dissertation topic approved by the professor who will           
supervise it; and, 
• be able to demonstrate clearly the relevance to EU studies of the dissertation topic. 
 
Applicants for this Fellowship should submit: 
(1) A one-page letter of application that specifies how the fellowship would be used; 
(2) A CV; 
(3) A 500 words précis of the project that also explains its relevance to EU studies; and, 
(4) Ask for two letters of support to be sent directly to EUSA. These letters should be from 
professors serving on the student’s dissertation committee, and one should be the chair. 
 
Please send applications to eusa@pitt.edu and use the heading “2012 E.B. Haas Fund 
Fellowship competition.” The firm deadline for applications to be received in the EUSA office is 
January 6, 2012. The successful applicant will be notified by February 17, 2012 at the latest, 
and will receive the grant soon thereafter. The fellowship will be paid in one lump sum by 
check and in US dollars only. 
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Congratulations to EUSA 
Prize Winners!
EUSA Award for Lifetime Achievement 
in European Studies
Jeremy Richardson
 
EUSA Award for Best Book Published 
in 2009 or 2010
Sara Hobolt Europe in Question
  Honorable Mention
Paul Craig The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics 
and Treaty Reform
Marc Howard  The Politics of Citizenship in 
Europe
EUSA Award for Best Dissertation 
Defended in 2009 or 2010
Nikoleta Yordanova 
Legislative Organisation of the European 
Parliament: The Role of Committees
EUSA Award for Best Paper Presented 
at the 2009 EUSA Conference
 Tina Freyburg “Planting the Seeds of 
Change”
